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All EU Member States in a State of Emergency
By mid-March, all EU member states were in a state of emergency, whether they
officially declared one or not. Across the EU many human rights were severely
restricted, particularly the right to free movement. As the table below shows,
serious restrictions have been in place across the Union. Even the least restrictive
measures – in Sweden – amounted to serious human rights limitations. Several
EU member states officially called a state of emergency (Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech
Republic, Finland, Hungary, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia,
Spain). ‘States of emergency’ have a bad name because they have often been
abused by dictatorships. However, in case of a real threat, such as covid-19, it is
not problematic to officially call a state of emergency. It is a possibility foreseen in
international human rights law to frame the response to an emergency (for more on
this, see DRI’s primer on international law and state of emergency). Not every state
of emergency is the same, however. Some exceed what is foreseen in international
human rights law. Derogations from human rights should be notified with the relevant
bodies of the Council of Europe and the United Nations. Among the EU-27 only
Estonia, Latvia and Romania have done so.
Legal Shortcomings of First Responses Were Mostly
Corrected Later (Exceptions: Hungary and Poland)
When the World Health Organization (WHO) declared covid-19 to be a “public
health emergency of international concern” on 31 January, only Italy reacted. It was
not until a few weeks later that most other EU member states suddenly jumped
into action and – in the rush – passed measures that were legally questionable.
Responses that should have been dealt with in laws were addressed by government
decrees or decisions of administrations. The constitutional and legal bases for
measures were often unclear or absent. However, after a few weeks – by the
end of March – almost all member states corrected early problems through legal
amendments (for example Bulgaria, France, Germany, Italy, Portugal). Nevertheless,
it appears that many constitutions would benefit from having stronger legal bases for
such emergencies.
The government of Hungary made the legal arrangements worse over time. While
the initial emergency response in Hungary was limited to a 14-day period, Parliament
then passed a law that allows the government to suspend existing laws, adjust their
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implementation and – the only country in the EU to do so – adopted new legislation
that criminalises speech about the pandemic. Statements that may distort the
truth and spread panic can now be punished with prison sentences of up to three
years. Since then, the Hungarian government has passed numerous emergency
decrees, many of them with no connection to covid-19 (building of a museum district,
forbidding sex changes), with no involvement of Parliament. Instead of holding
the government accountable, the ruling party in Parliament has been busy with
issues like refusing to ratify the Council of Europe’s Istanbul Convention on Violence
against Women.
The Polish government avoided applying an obvious constitutional provision on
natural disasters because the legal consequence would have been a postponement
of presidential elections until 90 days after the end of the extraordinary measures.
Judging that the incumbent president, a close ally of the ruling Law and Justice (PiS)
party, could win, the government created new legislation as a basis for the pandemic
response to avoid postponing the election.
The government plannedto hold the elections by postal ballot on 10 May despite
reservations by the election commission and Europe’s official election watchdog, the
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). On 6 May it changed
course and postponed the election. A new date is not known at the time of writing.
While political rights, such as the right to vote, should be maintained as much as
possible during an emergency, in this case the government objectives were of a
partisan nature and the vote was held against the wishes of the opposition. The fact
that the government appointed a PiS stalwart as the head of the Postal Service’s
management board, responsible for administrating the voting by mail, did nothing
to allay the fears of a partisan process. The Polish vote cannot be compared to
France’s first round of municipal elections in March, which the government held
in accordance with the wishes of most of the opposition, which were doing well
in opinion polls in contrast to the governing En Marche party. The vote did not
represent a government power play, but rather fair play towards the opposition. All
French parties then agreed that the second round should be postponed during the
pandemic.  
The Risks of Corruption
The emergency has resulted in the empowerment of governments to quickly
spend significant funds, be it for medical equipment or investments to support the
economy, at very short notice. Such a situation increases the risks of corruption.
Here, as with all emergency measures, the question is whether rules were abolished
unnecessarily or ignored, or whether established and accepted ways of rapid
procurement were chosen. For example, the European Commission clarified how
European procurement rules allow rapid procurement – even within hours – in cases
of “extreme urgency”. Here, as in all other aspects of state of emergency measures,
it is important that such rules are not abused for corruption and that they do not
stretch beyond the time of their necessity.
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Sometimes emergency measures significantly increase risks of corruption when
public procurement rules can be circumvented or when they are ignored. Serious
concerns were raised in particular around the high-pressure purchase of protective
equipment in late March across Europe.
The concern is marked in three EU countries that figure particularly low down on
Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index, namely Bulgaria (position
74 of 180 countries), Hungary and Romania (both at 70th place). In Romania, a
woman with a previous criminal conviction, who had served under current Prime
Minister Ludovic Orban in the Bucharest City Administration and in the Ministry of
Transport when he headed it, bought stakes in a dormant company on 11 March and
won a non-competitive government contract, selling the government on 19 March
protective gear which she had purchased the day before for €614,000 from a Turkish
supplier. According to reports half of the masks were faulty.
In Hungary, the government suddenly replaced the board of a publicly-traded
company that produces cardboard packages for medical products. Some of the new
board members have close ties to the ruling Fidesz party. No reasons were given.
It is important that checks and balances continue to function. In Italy, in late April,
the authorities arrested three local representatives accused of corruption in the
procurement of cleaning-service tenders. Rapid procurement procedures might be a
solution, but it cannot be done at the expense of transparency and accountability.
Too Many Laws – A Problem of Legal Certainty
In many EU member states a plethora of legal acts were published which weakened
legal certainty – making it harder for the administration, judges, attorneys and the
wider public to understand which rules would apply when. Often, there was a lack
of coherence to clarify which body was competent to enact measures and on which
legal basis. Such lack of clarity undermines accountability and makes it more difficult
for anyone seeking a remedy against a measure. In France, the Minister of the
Interior announced that the population risked fines for not respecting the confinement
24 hours before the fines were established. In Italy, the Minister of Health declared
extensions to freedom of movement, although this was within the Prime Minister’s
competence.
Emergency Communication
Proper government communication is essential to avoid confusion in a crisis. It is
also essential because democracy does not stop in an emergency. The public has
a right to be informed and to have a basis for an informed public debate. While
it is understandable that in the early days of the pandemic governments were
mostly occupied with addressing the immediate urgencies, the longer this crisis
takes, the better public communication should be to ensure democratic debate and
accountability. Indeed, the expectations of government communication must be very
high in a context of significant human rights restrictions.
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Many member states fell short of that obligation to inform. For example, while
the German Federal Government has published a lot of important information
on covid-19, it never published a written explanation of its overall plan (which
objectives, which indicators) to deal with this crisis. While it is true that the 16
states of Germany have the primary role in addressing the situation, the Federal
Government has played an important coordinating role. In Slovenia, a journalist
who filed an information request on the government’s measures was targeted in a
smear campaign by media close to the government. More positively, the Swedish
government explains prominently on its homepage what it hopes to achieve through
its measures.
Likewise, many member states have made too little effort to translate complex
legal arrangements, such as emergency decrees, into simple and understandable
guidance to its citizens. It is a rule of law problem if extreme restrictions of human
rights are not clearly and easily communicated to the public. In France, the official
journal website stopped summarising newly adopted legislation after the beginning
of the crisis, something it had previously done on a daily basis. In Italy, the website
of the civil protection – the organ in charge of crisis management – gathers the legal
measures but without further explanation on their content which makes it difficult for
a non-specialist audience to understand.
On the positive side, the Irish government has published an easy-to-understand
overview of the next steps in the government’s plan and what citizens should or
should not do. A non-EU country, Iceland, also provides a good example of timely,
accessible and easy-to-understand information on what is not allowed in the current
situation.
Finally, a facts-based public debate has been hampered by a lack of timely and
accessible information on essential infection data, such as the number of infections,
the number of fatalities and the number of tests administered, ideally all broken down
by region. Given that governments have severely restricted human rights to address
the crisis, they have an obligation to provide detailed data to justify these measures.
It is problematic for example that German media must rely mainly on data from the
Johns Hopkins University, because the official case reporting system lags behind by
several days. Almost no EU member state provides reliable data on the number of
tests administered. Once again, Iceland, provides an excellent example of how to
present clear and detailed public information on essential health data.
Many Constitutions Not Fit for Emergency Purpose
In most EU member states many of the early emergency measures were
controversial with the legal community, especially for the points raised above: a
plethora of acts with no clear hierarchy and order, significant restrictions by decree
or administrative decision, reduced roles for parliaments and courts. It became clear
that many EU member states do not have a sufficiently clear legal basis in their
constitution. While national constitutional and other high courts as well as European
courts will pass their final verdicts on many of these measures, it seems clear that in
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many countries a review of the constitutional basis for emergencies would be useful,
so that the legal system is better prepared next time.
Overview of Country Measures
The table below provides an overview of the situation in each EU state. In addition,
we examine the level of human rights restrictions in each country.
Human rights restriction levels:
• Moderate – having some impact on everyday life (increased health security on
borders, cancellation of large mass events, caution advised for individuals and
businesses), serious impact on some (like risk groups);
• Significant – having some impact on everyday life (borders partially closed,
limits on size of assemblies, shutting down some non-essential businesses,
schools closed for short periods);
• High – considerable impact on everyday life (borders closed for most traffic,
personal movement significantly limited, no assemblies, most businesses
restricted or closed, schools closed until further notice);
• Severe – overwhelming impact on everyday life (personal movement banned/
needs authorisation, borders fully closed, no assemblies, all but essential
businesses shut down, schools closed).
The data in this table were gathered from public sources and analytical articles by
DRI’s legal experts. Open questions were verified with country experts. DRI also
supported an online symposium hosted by Verfassungsblog, which contains detailed
analysis of state of emergency measures across the EU and beyond.
(The table was created with contributions by Théo Fournier. You can download the
table here.)
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This text was first published at Democracy Reporting International.
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